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ANTAEUS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: A 
NEW APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE COMMON 
LAW 
Harry R. Bader* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is a wilderness of beauty, hope, and wealth. To be sure, 
the Alaskan landscape is one that human beings, from Native Amer-
icans to the fur and gold seekers of a century ago, have altered. The 
land, however, adapted to these impacts, and its vast and varied 
ecosystems-from North Slope tundra to Pacific old-growth for-
ests-remained healthy, the original denizens still present in their 
appropriate niches. 
All this is now threatened. On the Delta River plain southeast of 
Fairbanks, dust claws the clean skies in clouds reminiscent of Dust 
Bowl ballads. Much of the wind-blown soil spawns from land made 
vulnerable when caterpillar tractors chained! spruce forest to make 
way for subsidized cash grain agriculture.2 The Taylor Highway 
moves past bilious streams swollen with the silt of placer mines. (A 
judge described Birch Creek, a federally designated wild and scenic 
river as "practically barren" of life due to placer mine sediments.)3 
• Assistant Professor of Natural Resource Law and Policy, University of Alaska, Fairbanks; 
Chairperson, Alaska Oversight Council on Oil and Hazardous Substances. J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 1988; B.S., Washington State University, 1985. 
1 Chaining involves the use of a large chain, each end of which is attached to a track-type 
tractor, to destroy small trees and heavy brush. The tractors drive parallel to one another, 
dragging the chain between them. 
2 In 1979, the state of Alaska created the Alaska Agricultural Action Council, which was 
designed to promote the clearing of 400,000 acres of land for large-scale industrial farming by 
1990. The state made land disposals throughout the 1980s in the Delta River area. Due to 
poor soils, falling farm prices, and an inadequate infrastructure, the project has failed to 
realize its goals. See C. ENGELBRECHT & W. THOMAS, AGRICULTURAL POLICY IMPLEMEN-
TATION IN ALASKA (1986). 
3 See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 664 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (D. Alaska 1987). 
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Enhancing substantive environmental law sufficiently to protect 
these resources that are threatened with destruction and degrada-
tion may require a new interpretation of the public trust doctrine. 
Alaska is no stranger to the trust doctrine. In its constitution and 
the decisions of its highest court, the state has clearly articulated 
its duty to maintain the broadest possible public access to fish, 
wildlife, and waters.4 Access, however, is an illusion if such resources 
exist only as atrophied forms of their former quality and quantity. 
To preserve access is not enough-the public trust doctrine must be 
applied as an affirmative instrument for ecological protection. 
The development of doctrines protecting the resource wealth of 
Alaska is not a topic of esoteric interest. As the most natural re-
source-rich state in the nation, Alaska is the ecologic and economic 
storehouse from whose bounty we will fashion our nation's future. 
For example, Alaska's commercial fishery is by far the largest in the 
country, constituting forty-six percent of total United States fish 
production; it is expected soon to exceed fifty percent of the United 
States harvest. 5 Furthermore, Alaska's coastal and continental shelf 
waters provide habitat for most of the nation's marine mammal 
population.6 In addition, beneath the state lies half of the nation's 
coal. Finally, of the wild waterfowl that hatch into life in United 
States wetlands, the majority do so under an Alaskan summer sun. 
Section II of this Article briefly chronicles the general develop-
ment of the public trust doctrine in the United States. Offered in 
Section III is a new theory for the application of the public trust 
doctrine. The Article concludes with summary observations regard-
ing the doctrine in Section IV. Without fortification of this substan-
tive environmental common law, cavalier development projects will 
jeopardize much of Alaska's and the rest of the nation's unique 
natural heritage. 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 
"Man does not make truth. Man, if he be not blind, only recognizes 
truth when he sees it."7 Thus, as the Emperor Justinian had 1400 
4 The Alaska Constitution states that "[ w ]herever occurring in their natural state, fish, 
wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use." ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 3. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted traditional common law principles of public trust 
doctrine in CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988). 
5 ALASKA SEA GRANT PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS, ALASKA SEAFOOD 
INDUSTRY STUDY: A SUMMARY 13 (1989). 
6 M. WEBER, AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORTS: 1986 339 (National Audubon Society 1986). 
7 JACK LONDON, The Water Boy in To BUILD A FIRE & OTHER STORIES 357 (1982). 
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years earlier, an American court in Arnold v. MundyB turned its 
eyes upon nature and observed truth. The court found that "by the 
law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all the social 
rights," the rivers that ebb and flow, the bays, and the coasts are 
common to all citizens and are sources from which they can find their 
sustenance. 9 With this recognition, the public trust doctrine found a 
home in American common law. 
The doctrine has made an arduous journey from its nadir under 
Roman law to its present position. Just as it has evolved into many 
forms in its progressive rise, the doctrine must continue to change 
if it is to retain its vibrancy in a world that increasing resource 
demands and a new recognition of the complexities involved in eco-
system management have made difficult. 
By Roman proclamation, the air, water, and sea were common 
property, owned by no one.1O The use of these resources was avail-
able to all, so long as the conduct of one individual did not infringe 
upon the use of the resources by others.11 The English adopted this 
principle but replaced the notion of common ownership with that of 
state ownership. The Crown held and protected these lands and 
resources for the benefit of all its subjects.12 In this fiduciary role 
the Crown could not appropriate the resources for its own use or 
convey them to others. 13 
The central preoccupation of the American public trust doctrine 
has been to maintain the broadest possible access to certain natural 
resources for public use. 14 The United States Supreme Court made 
the imperative of access clear in Martin v. Waddell's Lessee. 15 In 
Martin, the Court held that shores, rivers, and bays and the lands 
beneath them are a public trust held open for the benefit of the whole 
community.16 The principle impediment to expanding the scope of 
the doctrine was the atavistic common law requirement17 that waters 
8 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
9 [d. at 76-78. 
10 Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the 
People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1980). 
11 [d. at 197. 
12 Timothy J. Conway, Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding 
Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 622-23 (1984). 
13 [d. at 623. 
14 CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988); Orion Corp. v. State, 
747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 
163 (Mont. 1984); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893). 
16 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
16 [d. at 413-14. 
17 Independent of common law, some legislatures enacted statutes, such as the Great Pond 
Ordinance of 1641 in Massachusetts, that protected access to certain resources. 
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and shores be navigable or influenced by the ebb and flow of tides 
to be subject to the state's trust protection. The courts eventually 
loosened the restriction of tidality to meet the practical needs of a 
continental nation with large inland rivers and lakes. 18 Courts like-
wise diluted navigability as a prerequisite for trust application. For 
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lamprey v. Metcal.f9 
held that though many of the lakes in Minnesota could not be used 
for commercial purposes, this did not mean that the public right to 
fish, swim, and hunt was not protected. Reasoning that the impor-
tance of the lakes necessitated their protection in the future, the 
court concluded that it should not define navigability narrowly. 20 
The lodestar case in American public trust doctrine, upon which 
jurisdictions across the country have drawn, is Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Illinois. 21 In this case, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that a state could not deny public access to trust resources by 
conveying them to individuals for private use.22 The Court set forth 
a two-part test for conveyances23 that remains the dominant law in 
many states today.24 It stated that "[t]he control of the State for the 
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as 
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be 
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest 
in the lands and waters remaining."25 Many states since have refined 
this rule. Idaho, for example, considers several factors, including 
the degree of effect, the cumulative effects of similar actions, and 
the primary purposes for which a resource is best suited. 26 California 
requires that the state's intent to abandon the trust be "clearly 
expressed or necessarily implied" by the legislature. Under Califor-
nia law, if any interpretation of a statute is "reasonably possible" 
that would maintain the public's interest in a trust resource, "the 
court must give the statute such an interpretation. "27 
18 Stevens, supra note 10, at 202. 
19 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893). 
20 Id.; see also People v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451 (1971) (public should not be denied 
1J.se of waters because of narrow and outmoded interpretation of "navigability"). 
21 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
22 Id. at 455. 
23 Id. at 453. 
24 See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988); Kootenai 
Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983); City 
of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980). 
26 Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. 
26 Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1092-93; see also State v. Public Servo Comm'n, 
81 N.W.2d 71,73 (Wis. 1957). 
27 City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 369. 
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After World War Two, the public trust doctrine lapsed into rela-
tive disuse as a judicial tool until the classic article by Joseph L. 
Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention," resuscitated it in 1970.28 Citing the principles 
that Sax proffered, courts began to employ this doctrine with re-
newed vigor and to protect many public uses of shorelines and 
waters. Courts have identified, among other things, hunting, fishing, 
boating, undertaking scientific studies, preserving wildlife habitat, 
swimming, maintaining ecological integrity and aesthetic beauty, and 
retaining open space as legitimate public expectations protected by 
the public trust doctrine. 29 
Pressed by the need to balance resource protection with the de-
mands of a burgeoning populace, California courts in particular have 
embraced public trust principles with alacrity. In National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County30-popularly known as 
the "Mono Lake" case--the California Supreme Court analyzed three 
aspects of the trust doctrine in the context of water appropriations. 31 
The court examined the purposes of trust theory, the scope of the 
trust, and the duties of the state as trustee. 32 Noting the novelty of 
the issue, the majority found that public trust protection extends to 
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters where conduct on the 
tributaries affects the public trust values in the navigable water-
way.33 Before an agency can approve a water diversion, the court 
declared, it must consider the impact that such diversions will have 
on trust resources.34 Even after the agency has approved the div-
ersion, the state has a duty to continue supervision to ensure the 
protection of the resource.35 The court also examined vested appro-
priative water rights and concluded that they are not absolute and 
always have been subject to review and change under the trust 
doctrine. 
Not all commentators are happy with the current structure of 
public trust theory.36 One major advantage of the public trust doc-
28 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
29 See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 
671 P.2d at 1095; Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); People v. Mack, 97 Cal. 
Rptr. 448, 451 (1971). 
30 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
31 Conway, supra note 12, at 631. 
32 [d. 
33 National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 720-21. 
34 [d. at 712, 728. 
36 [d. at 728. 
36 See Richard J. Lazarus, Cha11{li11{l Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioni11{l the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986). 
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trine-or disadvantage, depending on one's philosophical perspec-
tive-is the immunity the doctrine enjoys from Fifth Amendment 
"takings" claims.37 In Orion Corp. v. State of Washington,38 the 
Washington Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine pre-
cludes a constitutional claim for taking without compensation be-
cause title to trust resources are acquired subject to whatever state 
action may be necessary to protect the public's interests in the trust 
resources. 39 Despite recent decisions by the United States Supreme 
Court that have created a milieu more amenable towards takings 
challenges against regulations,40 there is no indication at the present 
time that these decisions will enervate trust doctrine. 
Today, we must invigorate the doctrine with a consistent and 
pragmatic theory that will enable it to meet the needs for substantive 
environmental protection in the future. It is to this task that this 
Article now turns. 
III. A NEW THEORY FOR THE ApPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE: FOCUSING ON THE BIOTIC COMMUNITY 
The public trust doctrine did not arise simply to protect navigable 
waterways for navigation, commerce, and fishing.41 Rather, it re-
flects the fundamental precept that some resources in natural sys-
tems are so central to the well-being of the community that they 
must be protected by distinctive .principles.42 In other words, the 
doctrine rests on the idea that the continued diminishment of these 
common heritage resources would have such inestimable conse-
quences that the state cannot allow their impairment "to happen 
carelessly, accidentally, or by legerdemain. "43 Application of the pub-
lic trust doctrine permits the state to wield immense power to re-
strict and rearrange property rights and expectations44 because of 
37 Harrison C. Dunning, The Mono Lake Decision: Protecting a Common Heritage Resource 
from Death by Diversion, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,144, 10,148 (1983). 
38 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987). 
39 [d. at 1081-82. 
40 See NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
41 Mary K. McCurdy, Public Trust Protectionfor Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683, 711 (1989). 
42 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 269, 315 (1980). 
<3 Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A 
Modern View of Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 587 (1989) (quoting WILLIAM H. 
ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 158 (1986»; see also Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 
590 P.2d 709, 714-15 (Ore. 1979). 
... Dunning, supra note 37, at 10,147. See generally Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. 
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983). 
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the potential harm to future generations if the state did not have 
the authority to act. The doctrine places the state under a fiduciary 
obligation to protect trust resources45 and prevent private appropri-
ation. 46 So important are these resources and the need to protect 
them that the state cannot take any action to divest itself of its 
trusteeship.47 Succinctly phrased, the state no more can abdicate its 
trust obligations over public trust resources than it can abdicate its 
police powers in the administration of government and the preser-
vation of peace. 48 
Viewed in this context, the public trust doctrine is decidedly an-
throposolipsistic. 49 The goal of the doctrine is to protect certain 
resources not because it is either an ethical thing to do or a positive 
amenity, but because these resources are absolutely essential for 
human physical, spiritual, and economic well-being. The public trust 
doctrine therefore is not to be used as a general environmentalist 
tool, preserving a small fish here, a brine shrimp there, or someone's 
favorite pond or marsh. Rather, it should be used to maintain the 
health of natural systems. 
Despite what many may wish to believe, we are all creatures 
evolved from the natural environment. As such, humans depend 
upon interactions with healthy ecosystems for food, fiber, health, 
and mental happiness. 50 Reckless conduct, blind to the impacts upon 
the natural environment with which we must interact, may elicit 
devastating changes that could jeopardize our very existence. This 
concern is all the more critical today in light of the awesome power 
and enduring impacts of modern technology and its paraphernalia. 
It is too dangerous to impose reductionist simplicity for economic 
gain upon that which is so wondrously complex. An overly simplified 
biotic community no doubt would lack many of the qualities and vital 
forces upon which we depend for sound bodies and minds. 
As the courts began to realize the importance of certain natural 
resources in sustaining the human species, they extended the scope 
46 King, The Mono Lake Problem and the Public Trust Solution, 7 UCLA JOURNAL OF 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 67, 70 (1987). 
46 James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public 
Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 
565, 571 (1986). 
47 Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 781 (Wis. 1899) . 
.. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
4. This term was coined by human ecologist Gerald Young. It means "human only" values, 
as opposed to "human-centered" values. 
50 There is a multitude of work on the subject concerning the need for interaction between 
humans and the environment. See A. McNARY, BIOLOGY AND SOCIETY (1975); MURRAY 
BOOKCHIN, OUR SYNTHETIC ENVIRONMENT (1974). 
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of the public trust doctrine. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for 
example, applied the public trust doctrine's protection to wetlands, 
both publicly and privately owned, on the grounds that wetlands 
play an important role in a healthy environment. 51 California has 
taken steps in the same direction, applying the doctrine to tidelands 
because of their importance as ecological units. 52 
All of these judicial pronouncements, however, though consistent 
with public trust doctrine purposes, exemplify the inherent failure 
of this particular strategy. Judges are attempting the impossible by 
trying to identify which specific natural qualities and uses are nec-
essary for social well-being and therefore deserving of public trust 
protection. Biotic systems are too complex, and our scientific under-
standing too rudimentary, to attempt to isolate individual compo-
nents as essential. Instead, the public trust doctrine must be used 
to maintain the general health of natural systems. How can courts 
determine whether there is a proper integration of attributes in the 
natural environment to maintain human well-being? The answer lies 
in examining the natural biotic community. 
In general, one can assume that the ·healthier the natural com-
munity, the greater the likelihood that humans will have access to 
and use of those attributes in the environment that we require. The 
health of the natural environment by no means requires the mirror 
of the ecological climax community,53 though that certainly would be 
indicative of health. Like all states of being, health is not a specific 
point on a continuum; rather, it spans a range that allows for vari-
ation. One can define environmental health for a given system by 
the balance between the diversity54 and the stability of the resident 
biotic community. In determining the health of a particular biotic 
community, one must consider the appropriate seral stage55 for the 
locale. Diversity is a function of both richness-the number of species 
in a given community-and evenness-the distribution of species 
51 See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761,768-70 (Wis. 1972). 
52 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
53 The tenn "climax" means "the relatively stable stage or community attained by an 
available population of organisms in a given environment, often constituting the culminating 
development in a natural succession or being one of the transitory stable states through which 
many populations pass before attaining such culminating development." WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 423 (1986). 
64 See BARBOUR ET AL., TERRESTRIAL PLANT ECOLOGY 139 (1980). 
55 A "sere" is "a series of ecological communities that follow one another in the course of 
the biotic development of an area or fonnation from pioneer stage to climax." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2072 (1986). 
1992] PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 757 
within trophic levels. Stability means the ability of populations to 
maintain their numbers. 56 
The task of a reviewing court should be to determine whether a 
particular activity would be likely to impair substantially the health 
of a local ecological system. The court could accomplish this inquiry 
by assessing the impact of the activity in question upon the diversity 
and stability of the resident biotic community. If the activity is found 
to pose little or no threat to the biotic community, the planned 
project would survive judicial scrutiny so far as the public trust 
doctrine is concerned. Of course, the activity also would have to 
meet the burdens that statutes such as the Administrative Proce-
dures Act,57 the National Environmental Policy Act, 58 and the Clean 
Water Act59 impose. These statutory considerations, however, are 
quite independent of the common law principles of public trust doc-
trine. On the other hand, if the reviewing court determined that the 
activity did pose a threat to environmental health, then the court 
would have to order a modification of the activity or enjoin it alto-
gether. 
An important aspect of this proposed approach is that social policy 
"balancing" is not involved. There would be no extenuating circum-
stances that would justify ecosystem degradation. The public trust 
doctrine would afford absolute protection. Degradation, however, is 
not the same as modification, and for this reason, this approach would 
never demand "pure" preservation. An important departure that 
this proposed approach makes from current trust doctrine is that it 
would not immunize any resource from development activity that 
would not disrupt the biotic community, whether the community was 
a tideland, lake, or meadow. Thus, if a developer could prove that 
the biotic community would not incur a destabilizing stress due to the 
developer's conduct, then the public trust doctrine could not bar 
development. The obligation of the state to exercise continuing su-
pervision under the trust principles of National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court of Alpine County nonetheless would require the 
state to enjoin the development activity or issue specific compliance 
66 Odum, The Strategy of Ecosystem Development, 164 ScI. 262-70 (1969). 
67 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988). 
68 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-437Oc (1988). 
69 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
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orders if it later determined that the activity indeed was damaging. 60 
The state would have to take such action even if it already had 
approved the conduct. 
The benefit of the public trust approach that this Article proposes 
is that it would accomplish absolute ecological protection while cre-
ating a powerful incentive for industry to embark upon an intensive 
program of research and development for environmentally sensitive 
technologies. Government would tell industry that the public trust 
doctrine was an inviolable shield protecting the environment, and 
that it would tolerate no balancing or costlbenefit analyses in the 
public trust inquiry. Government also would inform industry and 
business, however, that application of the doctrine would never foil 
their expectations for resource development so long as they em-
ployed techniques and technologies that safeguard ecological health. 
In essence, this approach would internalize the true cost of natural 
resource utilization and thereby fairly eliminate that bane of envi-
ronmentalists, the negative externality. 
To be effective, the court's scope of inquiry would have to extend 
to cumulative effects. That is, the court would have to examine a 
planned activity in light of other foreseeable projects as well as the 
synergistic effects produced when the activity is coupled with cur-
rent activities. Moreover, the court would have to assess the inten-
sity and extent of the destabilization that the planned activity might 
cause. The threshold of intolerable harm would be a function of both 
of these factors. The greater the damage, the less the extent of 
disruption necessary to prohibit the activity; similarly, the greater 
the breadth of disruption, the less the intensity of harm necessary 
to invoke the prohibitions of the public trust doctrine. 
The problem of uncertainty will always haunt the courts. The 
assessment of uncertainty is inherently subjective. Moreover, ecol-
ogy and its environmental science derivatives sometimes can appear 
to be more art that hard science, defying meaningful quantification. 
There will be room for honest, valid disagreement as to whether 
particular conduct may impair the health of a local environment. In 
such situations, it is important for courts to recognize that error 
may be inevitable. In those circumstances, it therefore would be 
appropriate for a court to err on the side of protection. This approach 
to scientific uncertainty is entirely consistent with public trust the-
ory, which exhorts that the consequences of damage to public trust 
80 National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 727-
29 (Cal. 1983). 
1992] PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 759 
resources are so grave that contemporary society and future gen-
erations cannot permit such degradation "accidentally or care-
lessly. "61 
An effective legal doctrine must be cohesive, consistent, and pre-
dictable. The judiciary has attained a powerful role in government 
while maintaining an unusual degree of autonomy from usual dem-
ocratic processes. Therefore, courts must make great efforts to win 
the respect and confidence of the public they so intimately affect. A 
doctrine that waxes wildly or routinely disappoints valid expecta-
tions threatens not only its own life but the credibility of the judicial 
system as well. In order for a legal doctrine to be cohesive, there 
must be a rational connection between the core theory of the doctrine 
and the effects it produces. Second, the doctrine ought to be general 
enough that courts consistently can apply it to a wide variety of 
essentially similar situations without undertaking philosophical con-
tortions of the "Rube Goldberg" genre. Finally, the doctrine must 
be sufficiently simple that the public can understand its fundamental 
tenets well enough to predict outcomes from its application, espe-
cially as it relates to their own conduct. This permits individuals to 
conform their behavior to established norms. The approach to the 
public trust doctrine that this Article advocates achieves cohesion, 
consistency, and predictability. 
Reliance upon the biotic community places the judicial inquiry 
squarely within a sphere of environmental science that is widely 
accepted and firmly established. For example, Daubenmire62 and 
Gleason pioneered the field of plant community types63 and estab-
lished it as scientifically valid. Obviously, when courts base a prin-
ciple upon the dictates of firm science, the legitimacy of their deci-
sions is more readily accepted. 
Consistency in the application of this proposed approach would 
result from courts' adherence to the observations that human health 
depends upon a healthy environment, and that the public trust doc-
trine protects ecosystems from intolerable stress imposed by human 
61 See Blumm, supra note 43, at 587 (quoting WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 158-60 (1986». 
62 Rexford F. Daubenmire is an acclaimed ecologist whose work includes PLANT COMMU-
NITIES (1968) and PLANTS AND ENVIRONMENT (3d ed. 1974). 
68 Ecologists reading this Article will be aware at once of the tension that exists between 
the discrete and the continuum views of community that Daubenmire and Gleason advocates 
respectively offer. Also, it should be pointed out that this work has been based upon plant 
communities; however, it is appropriate as an example for the theory of judicial inquiry 
advanced here. 
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conduct. No matter what the resource at issue, courts would adopt 
the same theory and mode of inquiry. No longer would they be placed 
in the position of having to contort definitions in order to apply the 
public trust doctrine to novel situations. Whether the controversy 
concerned a tidal fiat, an intermittent stream, or an old-growth 
forest, a court would apply the same doctrine with the same stan-
dards, rules, procedures, and definitions. 
Finally, the interpretation of the public trust doctrine under this 
Article's approach lends itselfto predictability. Because courts would 
not be fashioning new terms and standards or suddenly finding un-
expected sources of authority to address critical issues in novel 
situations, resource users would be able to rely on a stable judicial 
environment in which to plan and act. Just as current application of 
the public trust doctrine does not prevent some changes to the 
natural state of trust resources,64 neither would this new approach 
to the trust doctrine. As part of the natural environment, humans 
will, like any organism, cause changes in the environment in which 
they live. Modification is acceptabl~egradation is not. For ex-
ample, we can learn to farm with nature in order to provide for our 
sustenance, or we can wage an illusory war of conquest using de-
structive techniques. 65 This Article's approach would not inherently 
equate resource use with resource degradation. Undoubtedly, human 
conduct will cause stress to the natural environment, but stress is 
not necessarily degradation. A drought is a stress on the prairie 
ecosystem, and an unusually cold and snowy winter adversely affects 
the wildlife of New England, but these are stresses that the immune 
system of a healthy environment in time can soothe and heal. Neither 
will induce a long-term or permanent disruption to the resident 
biological community. 
An example of a region that is punctuated with the endeavors of 
human industry yet retains a viable degree of ecological health is 
the "Northeast Kingdom" in northern Vermont. There, farms, vil-
lages, and small lumber operations form a mosaic with more unde-
veloped areas. The presence of people and their accouterments no 
doubt imposes a biological stress on the environment in that area, 
but it does not now appear to pose any significant threat to the 
64 See State v. Public Servo Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957); see also National 
Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 727-29. 
65 There are several good sources on this point. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Back to Eden, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1989, at 57. A more extensive work is MEETING THE EXPECTA-
TIONS OF THE LAND (Jackson et aI. ed8., 1984). 
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diversity and stability of the biotic community there. It is a land 
worth working and living in. One may ask whether the public trust 
approach proposed here would impose an idyllic legal principle upon 
the environs of N ew York City. The answer to this question is no. 
The purpose of the public trust doctrine is to preserve natural sys-
tems. Much development in urban and industrial areas would not 
encroach upon natural systems. Where, however, such systems do 
occur, such as the Hudson River or open space parklands, a court 
would apply the trust doctrine. 
The public trust doctrine recognizes that humans are part of, not 
apart from, the natural world by attempting to harmonize human 
needs with environmental health. Viewed in this light, the public 
trust doctrine becomes the doctrine of Antaeus, protecting us from 
cavalier conduct that threatens to cut us off from our natural roots. 
As surely as Antaeus lost his physical strength the moment he broke 
contact with the earth, we too will lose our vitality if we lose access 
to and use of a healthy natural environment. The public trust doc-
trine must be available to protect all the natural resources that 
humans require for their well-being. It ought to afford ecosystem 
protection by serving as a tool, for example, for enjoining conduct 
that wantonly fells the giants of old-growth forests in a manner 
jeopardizing anadromous fisheries and rare wildlife,66 and for pro-
tecting fragile wetlands that are necessary for water purification and 
flood protection. It is time to recognize that all natural resources-
not just those associated with tides, navigability, and water-require 
trust protection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The marriage of absolute ecological protection with absolute access 
for the purpose of utilizing natural resources comes the closest to 
the true essence of the public trust doctrine. The impact of this 
approach, premised on the notion of environmental health, could be 
dramatic. 
The Mono Lake calculus67 requires state courts and agencies to 
consider the effect of their decisions on the resources that the public 
trust protects. 68 In dealing with the issue of water diversion, the 
66 Jerry Franklin at the University of Washington points out that it may be possible to 
harvest old growth without disturbing ecological health. See Toward a New Forestry, AMER-
ICAN FORESTS, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 1-8. 
67 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
68 National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 712. 
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court in the Mono Lake case required decisionmakers to attempt, so 
far as possible, to avoid or minimize any harm to interests protected 
by the public trust. 69 Thus, the public trust doctrine as applied in 
that case is essentially procedural, with a weak substantive compo-
nent-procedurally, decisionmakers must embark upon a policy bal-
ancing analysis, and substantively, they must attempt to minimize 
environmental harms. 
The calculus advocated here would be very different than that the 
Mono Lake case outlined. If a court were to apply this Article's 
expanded public trust theory to the Mono Lake case, it would have 
to ask if the proposed water diversions posed a substantial threat to 
the diversity and stability of the ecosystem for which the lake is the 
focal point. To ascertain the answer, the court would have to examine 
whether the increased salinity resulting from the diversions would 
decrease the dominant phytoplankton population in the lake, and 
whether an increase in the more salt-tolerant organisms that cur-
rently make up only a small portion of the total species population 
in the lake would compensate for this loss in productivity.70 Next, 
the court would have to determine if the resident and migratory bird 
populations, which appear to be dependent on the lake, would be 
able to compensate for the loss of a productive Mono Lake.71 Pred-
ation, due to increased access to nests because of lowered lake levels, 
is another concern the court would have to address. If the answers 
to these questions indicated that either current or future water 
diversions would severely disrupt the ecosystem, the court would 
be obligated to issue either an injunction or specific compliance or-
ders eliminating the threat posed by Los Angeles's water demands. 
The court would have to act regardless of social policy concerns. If, 
on the other hand, the diversions were to cause chemical changes in 
Mono Lake that altered the lake's biotic composition without sub-
stantively changing its stability and diversity,72 and if the waterfowl 
could compensate for the loss of their preferred food species, then 
the public trust doctrine would be powerless to bar the diversions. 
89 [d. 
70 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MONO LAKE ECOSYSTEM: EFFECTS OF CHANGING 
LAKE LEVEL 187 (1987). 
71 [d. at 93. 
'12 Diversity can be maintained even though sweeping changes in the biotic composition of 
a community occurs. For example, if species A is reduced from 97% to 4% of total composition 
while species B increases from 7% to 96%, the original diversity still essentially would be 
maintained. The stability criteria would be met if the organisms in the new biotic arrangement 
were able to maintain their numbers. 
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A court could apply the same analysis to Alaska's agricultural 
lands policy or to the old-growth timber harvests that are occurring 
under state jurisdiction on southeast Alaska's public and private 
lands. Much to the dismay of many environmental preservationists, 
this type of consumptive use of natural resources could be permitted 
and even advocated under trust theory if the developers or users of 
these resources could demonstrate, for example, that advances in 
forest management practices could protect ecological diversity and 
stability. Courts could issue orders that modified damaging practices 
so as to ensure that the harvests did not impair the health of the 
environment while still permitting consumptive development. If, 
however, conduct could not be squared with the environmental 
health criteria, then the public trust doctrine conduct would abso-
lutely bar it. 
The public trust doctrine originated out of the desire to protect 
natural systems so as to ensure their beneficial use by society. Today, 
we must expand the doctrine in a manner that faithfully links envi-
ronmental protection and resource utilization. The theory offered in 
this Article both accomplishes the task of protection, access, and use 
and creates incentives for the further development of environmen-
tally sound enterprises. 
